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Abstract— Spurred by the growth of transportation network
companies and increasing data capabilities, vehicle routing and
ride-matching algorithms can improve the efficiency of private
transportation services. However, existing routing solutions do
not address where drivers should travel after dropping off a
passenger and before receiving the next passenger ride request,
i.e., during the between-ride period. We address this problem
by developing an efficient algorithm to find the optimal policy
for drivers between rides in order to maximize driver profits.
We model the road network as a graph, and we show that
the between-ride routing problem is equivalent to a stochastic
shortest path problem, an infinite dynamic program with no
discounting. We prove under reasonable assumptions that an
optimal routing policy exists that avoids cycles; policies of this
type can be efficiently found. We present an iterative approach
to find an optimal routing policy. Our approach can account
for various factors, including the frequency of passenger ride
requests at different locations, traffic conditions, and surge
pricing. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the approach by
implementing it on road network data from Boston and New
York City.
I. INTRODUCTION
Advances in information technology and decision theory
are helping revolutionize the market for private transportation
services. Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) like
Lyft and Uber utilized internet-enabled ride requests to
quickly grow their market share in private transportation.
From 2014 to 2016, Uber’s market share for ride-hailing
services rose from 18% to 75% in the United States [1].
Policy efforts increasingly support the concept of mobility as
a service [2], increasing the economic importance of private
transportation services. However, TNCs are also associated
with concerns related to increased congestion and low driver
wages.
Tools from decision theory can utilize new sources of
consumer and driver data to help improve the efficiency
of private transportation services. TNCs typically feature
automated passenger ride matching and prices that vary
geographically and temporally. Higher prices during peak
demand periods are commonly referred to as surge prices.
There is new opportunity for developing efficient algorithms
to optimize surge pricing, improve system efficiency, and to
help increase driver wages.
In this paper, we consider the situation where a driver
seeks to maximize the expected value of their profits by
optimizing routing decisions during the between-ride period,
the time period after a driver drops off a passenger and before
they receive their next ride request.
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We formulate this problem as an undiscounted dynamic
program with an uncertain number of decision stages; our
formulation is equivalent to a stochastic shortest path prob-
lem. We prove that the between-ride problem has special
characteristics; given reasonable assumptions, it can be ef-
ficiently solved as a dynamic program with a finite number
of stages. We implement our algorithm using road network
data from Boston and New York City, demonstrating that
our approach is practical and scalable. Our implemented
algorithm can directly advise drivers between rides, which
could bring substantial benefits to transportation efficiency.
It can also help increase driver wages and reduce costs.
Current research approaches regarding algorithms for pri-
vate transportation services focus on the issue of driver-
passenger matching. They encompass a wide variety of
scenarios, including but not limited to: matching algorithms
for ride-sharing and carpooling services [3] [4] [5], private
transportation services with ride-sharing [6], and generaliza-
tions of the ride-matching problem to cases where passengers
might be asked to transfer over to another vehicle in the
middle of their journey [7]. Algorithms for driver-passenger
matching typically focus on the period after passengers
have made a trip request. Dispatch algorithms can move
drivers to higher value areas, but they do not provide routing
suggestions to private drivers to optimize their personal
profits.
Our approach complements the aforementioned work on
ride-matching: our algorithm can be used to navigate drivers
towards areas with high probability of new passenger re-
quests by providing routing directions that align with their
profit motive. These results can improve the effectiveness
of existing algorithms by helping move unmatched drivers
to higher value locations where they are more likely to be
matched to a ride when a ride request is issued.
The issue of location-based and distance-based pricing
policy is also an active area of research. Research demon-
strates how spatial pricing policy can be implemented to
achieve better matching between supply of drivers and
demand of passengers [8]. Another study investigates the
differences between dynamic and static pricing strategies [9].
Each of these papers focus on pricing strategies, and drivers
are assumed to move efficiently towards areas with higher
demand and prices. It is unlikely that drivers are able to
make optimal between-ride decisions without the assistance
of routing technology; the between-ride routing problem is
complicated, requiring the synthesis of multiple data sources.
Again, our proposed algorithm complements existing re-
search: it provides optimal paths for drivers between rides to
maximize driver profits, given an existing pricing policy. If
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a pricing policy is efficient, our approach can ensure that the
benefits of the pricing policy are attained. The combination
of research areas can help create a more coordinated network
system, reducing waiting time for passengers and allowing
more driver-passenger matches to occur.
Section II describes the model and formulates the between-
ride routing problem as a stochastic shortest path problem,
a type of dynamic program. Section III proves that we can
solve the between-ride routing problem by using a finite-
horizon dynamic program, where the number of stages is
no greater than the number of nodes in the transportation
network. Section IV presents a practical algorithm for finding
an optimal solution to the between-ride routing problem, and
Section V describes an implementation of our approach using
road network data from Boston and New York City.
II. TECHNICAL MODEL
This section details the model for optimizing a between-
ride route in order to maximize the expected value of
profits for a driver. First, we detail the relevant parameters.
Second, we explain the probability model whereby a driver
receives ride requests at a particular location according to
an exponential distribution. We specify the expected value
of a route along points x ∈ R2 on a 2-dimensional map.
In the following Subsection II-A, we present a model of
the road network as a directed, connected graph. We take
the parameters of interest to be constant along each edge.
We explain the driver objective function and optimization
problem in terms of discrete decisions on the graph.
Consider a specific driver that does not currently have a
passenger. Let w be the driver’s wage rate, i.e. the value
of their time. Let f be their fuel and vehicle cost per unit
distance driven.
For each location x on the map, let Rx be the expected
value of the profit from a ride request the driver receives
at location x. We assume that the random profit from the
ride accounts for its various features, including length, price,
and duration. For tractability, we assume that rides are
undifferentiated aside from the expected value of their profit.
In practice, ride opportunities can vary in other ways as well.
For instance, rides at some locations could be more likely
to end at high-value locations, which would increase the
expected value of profit from subsequent rides. In practice,
this could be incorporated into these results by adjusting
Rx to account for relevant characteristics, but a proper
formulation would be non-myopic with regard to the value
of subsequent rides. Future research could focus on the case
where the value of subsequent rides is directly incorporated
to the model; this would lead to an interesting formulation
over multiple potential rides.
Furthermore, let Qx be the the pickup rate at location
x, i.e. the expected value of the number of ride requests per
minute. The values Rx and Qx are indexed by x because they
can vary at different points in the transportation network.
These variables can change over time, but the algorithm
assumes that they are static over the course of the between-
ride decision making. This is a reasonable assumption given
the short duration of between-ride routing; research from
Denver suggests that the average between-ride period is less
than 12 minutes, with a median of 7.5 minutes [10]. If
inputs change or shocks occur, the algorithm can be rerun
to optimize the remaining route during the between-ride
period. This allows drivers to respond to real-time changes
in demand and congestion.
Our model assumes that Rx and Qx are not influenced by
the driver’s route. It would also be interesting to consider
the case where drivers actions directly influence the price
and demand for rides, for instance in a game-theoretic or
mean-field model.
At any position x, we assume that ride requests arrive
according to a Poisson process, and we model passenger ride
requests via an exponential distribution. Consider a driver
at position x(0) who travels along the trajectory x(t) in
continuous time, and let M be the random variable of the
time the driver receives their first ride request along route
x(t). Then
P(M ≥ t) = exp
(∫ t
0
−Qx(s) ds
)
(1)
In general, we assume the drivers must accept their first
ride request, as is commonly required for drivers in TNCs.
Let J be the expected value of the profit through the next
ride period for the between-ride driver on trajectory x(t) at
each time t. J is given by
J =
∫ ∞
0
(
Rx(t)Qx(t) − w − f dx
dt
)
P(M ≥ t) dt (2)
In Equation 2, the first term Rx(t)Qx(t) corresponds to
the expected revenue earned at x(t), taking into account the
likelihood of receiving a passenger match while at x(t). The
second term w is the cost due to time spent waiting, while
the third term f dxdt represents fuel costs. The trajectory x(t)
is differentiable, so dx(t)dt exists and is finite for all t. It
represents the speed traveled along the route, so it accounts
for local vehicle speeds and congestion.
From Equations (1) and (2) we obtain the value of a driver
waiting stationary at a particular location z, i.e. with x(t) = z
for all t:
J˜ =
∫ ∞
0
(RzQz − w)e−tQz dt = Rz − w
Qz
(3)
This expression is intuitive: if a driver waits at location z
until they receive a passenger match, they receive a ride
match eventually with probability 1. Thus, their expected
revenue is Rz . The cost of waiting is their wage rate w times
the expected value of the amount of time until they receive
a passenger match Q−1z .
In general, a driver at location x(0) seeks to choose a
trajectory x(t) to maximize (2). In the following section, we
will model the road network as a graph and formulate the
decision problem as a dynamic program in discrete time and
space. As we will show, this leads to a tractable decision
problem that can be efficiently solved.
Fig. 1. Model of a simple road network.
A. Road Network Model
To solve the between-ride routing problem, we model the
road network as a directed, connected graph G = (N,E).
Each edge e ∈ E represents a section of a road, while
the set of nodes N includes, but is not limited to, all
road intersections.1 Let |N | = n. Note that E includes all
loops; i.e. ∀i ∈ N , (i, i) ∈ E. A driver on the edge (i, i)
corresponds to the action of a driver waiting at node i.
The driver seeks to choose a route to maximize their
expected profit over an infinite horizon:
max
µk(xk)
lim
N→∞
E[
N−1∑
k=0
g(xk, xk+1, µk(xk))] (4)
We can formulate the between-ride routing problem (4)
as a stochastic shortest path problem2, which is an infinite
horizon dynamic program and a type of Markovian Decision
Problem (MDP). Let the state space X = N ∪ {m}, where
we augment the set of nodes N with a terminal state m.
When a driver moves to state m, we say that they are no
longer in the between-ride routing period, because they have
either found a rider or stopped offering rides. Once the driver
reaches state m, they derive zero additional cost or value, so
the decision problem equivalently terminates.
The function g(xk, xk+1, µk(xk)) represents the value of
transitioning to state xk+1 from state xk after choosing
policy µk, which prescribes an action for each state in each
stage of the decision problem. It includes the potential value
of receiving a ride match, less the costs associated with the
driver’s time and fuel costs. The transition probabilities are
stationary, and they are given by pij(µ) = P(xk+1 = j|xk =
i, µk = µ).
At a specific state i ∈ X , the driver chooses the next
location j with edge (i, j) ∈ E. For example, at node i ∈ N ,
the driver could choose to stay at node i, turn right to travel to
1Nodes can also be used to model a specified point along a road segment
where there is no intersection with other roads. These additional nodes are
equivalent to intersections with only 1-2 options for directed travel: continue
straight, or (possibly) make a u-turn.
2Stochastic shortest path problems were first formulated by [11]. Existing
research [12] extends the analysis to the case where transition values may
be positive or negative, which is helpful for our analysis. The two-volume
textbook [13][14] provides additional information on stochastic shortest path
problems in each volume.
node k, or turn left to travel to node ` if (i, i), (i, k), (i, `) ∈
E. If j 6= i, then the time to traverse the edge from i to j
is not a decision variable; it is given by the speed of traffic.
If j = i, then we say that the driver is waiting at node i,
and the driver can choose exactly how long to wait at node
i before making a subsequent decision.
Formally, the driver chooses an action u(i) ∈ U(i) where
U(i) is the set of admissible actions at state i. The action
u(i) is a double, i.e. u(i) = (u1, u2). The driving decision
u1 ∈ {j ∈ N |(i, j) ∈ E} ∪ {m} is the driver’s choice of
the next location. The waiting or travel time u2 is chosen
from the set u2 ∈ (0,∞] if u1 = i. Otherwise, u2 = T(i,j).
T(i,j) is the time required to travel from node i to j along
edge (i, j) at the current speed of traffic, taking into account
traffic and congestion.
Additionally, for all i ∈ N , there is an admissible action
u(i) with u1 = m. This describes the case where the driver
stops searching for another ride request and stops offering
rides. This can happen, for instance, at the the end of a shift
or if prices are too low for the driver to keep searching for
the next ride request.
Consider the transition probabilities and profits for a driver
at node i ∈ N . Let the driver elect action u(i) = (j, t) ∈
U(i) with e = (i, j) ∈ E. If j = i, then t is a decision
variable; otherwise, t = Te. Along edge e, the constant Qe >
0 represents the arrival rate for ride requests. Then, from (1)
pik(u) =

1− e−tQe k = m
e−tQe k = j
0 otherwise
(5)
Remember that if j 6= i, then t = Te, because drivers
must move at the speed of traffic along a particular edge.3
In this case, there is a probability 1− e−QeTe that they will
be matched with a ride; otherwise, they will move to node
j for the next decision stage after a duration Te.
A driver making the decision u(i) = (j, t) at node i
receives profit
g(i, k, u) =

Re − φe(t)(w + fSe) k = m
−t(w + fSe) k = j
0 otherwise
(6)
As before, the values w and f refer to the driver’s fixed
wage rate and fuel/vehicle cost. The expected value of the
ride revenue for every edge e ∈ E is known and stationary
in the time period of interest, and given by Re > 0. The
driver drives at a constant speed Se along each edge (which
is directly the edge distance divided by Te).
The variable φe(t) is the expected value of the time until a
match occurs along edge e, when the edge is traversed over a
time period t, conditional on the fact that a match does occur
in [0, t]; φe(t) = E[Me|Me < t] = Q−1e + t(1− eQet)−1.
From (6), we can write the expected value of the profit
at any stage i according to the transition probabilities and
3The original map can be augmented with a node in the middle of edges
with curbside parking or waiting zones, in order to model the case where
drivers can stop and wait along some edges.
duration associated with the chosen action u(i) = (j, t),
again with e = (i, j):
g(i, u) = E[g(i, k, u)]
= (1− e−tQe)(Re − w + fSe
Qe
)
(7)
Note that Sh = 0 for loops h, i.e. edges of the form h =
(i, i). The idea is that the only cost for drivers when they
are waiting is due to their time, not due to gas or other
per-distance vehicle costs. When u2 = ∞, we evaluate the
associated transition probabilities and profits as the limits of
the provided equations when t goes to infinity; these limits
exist for each of the provided expressions in (5), (6), and
(7).
Since m is the terminal node, pmm(u) = 1 and
g(m, t)(u) = 0 for any u ∈ U(m). The driver receives
value when they transition to m randomly by receiving a
ride request. Once a driver reaches m, they have accepted
a ride request or stopped offering rides. They receive no
additional value and the decision problem ends. As explained
previously, at any node i ∈ N , the driver can select to stop
offering rides; mechanistically, this is performed as an action
to move directly to the terminal node without any reward.
For u(i) with u1 = m, pim(u) = 1 and g(i, u) = 0. The idea
is that the driver can elect to stop offering rides at any time,
which incurs no further cost but eliminates the opportunity
of collecting revenue from a potential ride.
Going forward, we assume that local maxima of Re− wQe
are defined as nodes. Consider an edge e = (j, k) with j 6= k.
Then
Re − w
Qe
≤ max
i={j,k}
{R(i,i) − w
Q(i,i)
} (8)
From any input data, it is straightforward to ensure that a
map meets the required assumption by adding a node along
or in the middle of any edge that has value Re− wQe greater
than that value for each of their adjacent nodes.
The policy µ defines actions u(i) ∈ U(i) for each state
i ∈ X in each decision period k. In practice, the policy
µ = (µ1, µ2, ...) can vary in each decision stage. Therefore,
the action taken at node i in stage k under policy µ is µk(i) =
(µk,1(i), µk,2(i)). However, we focus on stationary policies
where µ = (µ, µ, ...) at each stage. As we will show, at
least one of these stationary policies is optimal, justifying
our narrow focus. Due to the focus on stationary policies, in
the subsequent Section we drop the stage k subscript from
our notation. Instead, µ refers to stationary policies and µ1(i)
and µ2(i) refer to the actions (direction and waiting time)
associated with policy µ at node i ∈ N .
III. RESULTS
Optimal policies for infinite horizon dynamic programs
like (4) are typically solved using convergence of value
iteration (VI) algorithms [13]. In general, this can lead to
sub-optimal results despite extensive computation periods;
this could limit their value for the between-ride routing prob-
lem, since driving suggestions should ideally be provided
to multiple drivers in a network and available very quickly
after a driver drops off their previous passenger and enters
the between-ride period. However, in this section, we show
that the between-ride routing problem has special structure
that guarantees that allows it to be efficiently solved as a
finite-horizon dynamic program with n stages.
Since every node and edge has a non-zero probability of
a match,4 then for any policy, there is always a positive
probability that the termination state will be reached.
Then as explained by [13], optimal values J∗(1), ...J∗(n)
at nodes i ∈ N indexed by 1, ...n satisfy Bellman’s Equation:
J∗(i) = min
u∈U(i)
{g(i, u)+
n∑
j=1
pij(u)J
∗(j)} i = 1, ...n (9)
First, we will show that there is exists optimal stationary
policy where for all states i, µ(i) obtains the minimum of (9)
and where the driver waits until they receive a ride request
at any node where they choose to wait. Then we will show
that this optimal stationary policy has no cycles, i.e. P(xk =
i, x` = i) = 0 for any states i ∈ N , and stages k, ` ∈ N.
Together, this implies that an optimal policy can be found
using a type of value iteration algorithm requiring at most
n+ 1 steps.
Proposition 1. There exists a stationary policy µ∗ that is
optimal for the decision problem (4). Under this stationary
policy, whenever a driver waits at a specific node, they plan
to remain at that node until they receive a ride request, i.e.
∀i ∈ N , µ∗1(i) = i implies µ∗2(i) =∞.
Proof. First, let U˜(i) define a restricted action space for
node i. We say that u(i) = (u1, u2) ∈ U˜(i) if u1 ∈ {j ∈
N |(i, j) ∈ E}∪{m} and u2 =∞ if u1 = i and u2 = T(i,j) if
u2 = j 6= i. Note that ∀i ∈ N , U˜(i) ⊂ U(i). This restricted
action space implies that whenever a driver chooses to wait
at a node, they will wait at that node until they receive a ride
request.
The values of J∗(1), ...J∗(n) given by (9) are unchanged
if we replace the constraint sets U(i) with U˜(i). To see this,
fix J∗(1), ...J∗(n) according to (9), and for each i fix a
set of actions µ∗(i) that attain the optimal values of (9) for
each state i. Define the set I = {i|µ∗1(i) = i}. Define an
additional policy µ such that ∀i /∈ I , µ(i) = µ∗(i), and
∀i ∈ I , µ1(i) = µ∗1(i) = i but µ2(i) =∞.
For an arbitrary policy µ˜, let there be some i ∈ N with
µ˜1(i) = i and µ˜2(i) = ti. Let ` = (i, i). Then ∀i with
µ˜1(i) = i,
Jµ˜(i) = (1− e−tiQ`)(R` − w
Q`
) + e−tiQ`Jµ˜(i) (10)
due to equations (5) and (7) and by definition of the terminal
state with J(m) = 0. This implies that ∀i ∈ I
Jµ∗(i) = R` − w
Q`
= Jµ(i) (11)
4We could relax this assumptions, but in practice a match is possible
anywhere, because drivers can be matched with passengers that are near their
location. A driver can receive a match in a nearby residential neighborhood,
for instance, while traveling along a highway.
Fig. 2. First few steps of our algorithm on a simple road network. Red arrows indicate optimal paths found so far. Initially, the algorithm sets all drivers
to stay where they are. By the end of the fourth step, the algorithm dictates that drivers at V1 and V2 should go to V4 and V3 respectively, while drivers
at V4 and V3 stay where they are.
The first equality is found by evaluating (10) for µ˜(i) =
µ∗(i) and algebraically solving for Jµ∗(i). The second
equality is found by evaluating (10) for µ(i) by taking the
limit of the right hand side as ti →∞.
Subsequently, this implies that ∀i /∈ I , Jµ∗(i) = Jµ(i),
since for each i /∈ I , the objective function in (9) is
unchanged. Therefore, we can restrict the decision space to
U˜i, and the same J∗(1), ...J∗(n) as above satisfy
J∗(i) = min
u∈U˜(i)
{g(i, u) +
n∑
j=1
pij(u)J
∗(j)} i = 1, ...n
(12)
Therefore, any policy µ that obtains the minimum in (12)
also obtains the minimum in (9).
For each state i, the optimization problem in (12) describes
a finite and discrete choice set with |U˜(i)| ≤ n + 1.
Therefore, there exists some µ such that for all i ∈ N , µ(i)
obtains the maximum in (12). This µ describes a stationary
policy, because the objective function and constraints in (12)
do not change across decision periods. We showed that µ
also obtains the maximum of (9). As shown by [13], this
implies that µ is an optimal policy for the decision problem
(4).
Proposition 2. There exists an optimal stationary policy µ
that meets the characteristics of Proposition 1 and has no
cycles with probability 1, i.e. P(xk = i, xk′ = i) = 0 for any
state i ∈ N and decision stages k, k′ ∈ N.
Proof. Let µ refer to an optimal stationary policy that meets
the criteria of Proposition 1. By examining (5), we see that
P(xk = i, xk′ = i) > 0 under policy µ only if the policy
admits a cycle (possibly of length 1): ∃{`1, `2, ..., `p} ⊂ N
such that under µ, we have that µ1(`1) = `2, µ1(`2) = `3, ...,
µ1(`p) = `1. For each i ∈ 1, ...p, let ei = (`i, µ1(`i)) ∈ E.
Assume the policy admits a cycle. Without loss of gen-
erality, let `1 be the maximum valued waiting node in the
loop:
`1 = arg max
i∈{`1,`2,...,`p}
{R(i,i) − w
Q(i,i)
} (13)
and let V (`1) be the optimal value of the objective function
in (13). Then, by (8) and because f, Se > 0, for all i ∈ 1, ....p
we have that g(`i, µ) ≤ p`im(µ)V (`1).
Then, we can write Bellman’s equation for the policy µ
as
Jµ(`1) = g(`1,mu) + p`1`2(µ)g(`2,mu)
+ p`1`2(µ)p`2`3(µ)g(`3,mu) + ...
+ p`1`2(µ)p`2`3(µ)...p`p`1(µ)(g(`p,mu) + Jµ(`1)) (14)
Let P` be the probability of receiving a ride request anywhere
along the cycle, i.e. P` = 1 − p`1`2(µ)p`2`3(µ)...p`p`1(µ).
Then
P`Jµ(`1) = g(`1,mu) + p`1`2(µ)g(`2,mu)
+ p`1`2(µ)p`2`3(µ)g(`3,mu) + ...
+ p`1`2(µ)p`2`3(µ)...p`p`1(µ)g(`p,mu) (15)
and
P`Jµ(`1) ≤ p`1m(µ)V (`1) + p`1`2(µ)p`2m(µ)V (`1)
+ p`1`2(µ)p`2`3(µ)p`3m(µ)V (`1) + ...
+ p`1`2(µ)p`2`3(µ)...p`p`1(µ)p`pm(µ)V (`1)
= P`V (`1) (16)
Since P` > 0, this implies that Jµ(`1) ≤ V (`1).
Let µ′ define a policy with µ′(j) = µ(j) for all j ∈ N
with j 6= `1, and µ′1(`1) = `1 and µ′2(`1) = ∞. Then as
shown in (11), Jµ′(`1) = V (`1). Therefore, considering also
the optimality of policy µ, Jµ(`1) = Jµ′(`1). Due to this
equality, and since µ′(j) = µ(j) for all j 6= `1, then ∀i ∈
N , Jµ′(i) = Jµ(i). Therefore, µ′ is an optimal stationary
policy. If µ′ still contains a cycle (for instance, if µ contained
multiple such cycles), this procedure can be repeated until
the resulting policy has no such cycles; this would require
at most n repetitions.
Let µ∗ be the first policy constructed using (potentially
multiple) iterations of the above procedure, starting from the
original optimal stationary policy µ, such that µ∗ has no cy-
cles. Then under µ∗ there does not exist any {`1, `2, ..., `p} ⊂
N with |{`1, `2, ..., `p}| > 1, such that µ∗1(`1) = `2,
µ∗1(`2) = `3, ..., µ
∗
1(`p) = `1. The set µ
∗ eliminates all
policy cycles with two or more nodes.
Furthermore, in µ∗, for all i with µ∗(i) = i,
then µ∗2(i) = ∞. Thus, for any subset of nodes
{`1, `2, ..., `p} ⊂ N , containing an arbitrary number of
nodes, p`1`2(µ
∗)p`2`3(µ
∗)...p`p`1(µ
∗) = 0. Therefore, under
policy µ∗, for any i ∈ N , k, k′ ∈ N, P(xk = i, xk′ = i) = 0.
Equivalently, there exists an optimal policy µ∗ that has no
cycles with probability 1.
The policy µ∗ represents an optimal stationary policy with
no cycles. Therefore, every decision node is visited at most
once. This implies that there are at most n decision stages.
Furthermore, there is an optimal stationary policy over the
n decision stages. Therefore, from any starting node x0, we
have that (4) is exactly solved by
max
µ(xk)
E[
n∑
k=0
g(xk, xk+1, µk(xk))] (17)
This can be solved exactly by n iterations of a Value Iteration
(VI) algorithm, which we present in the following section.
IV. PATH-FINDING ALGORITHM
This section describes the process and the Value Iteration
(VI) algorithm we developed for the between-ride problem to
solve for the optimal values in equation (17) and, therefore,
equation (4). First, we pre-process the network graph to
ensure it satisfies the condition (8). This section describes
the algorithm and proves that our algorithm is optimal for
the appropriately pre-processed map.
The main algorithmic steps can be described as follows:
1) Initially, we calculate the expected driver revenue J˜(x)
for waiting at every location x, from (3).
2) We “relax” each edge iteratively to see if traveling
through it will provide a more optimal path for drivers
on the connecting vertices. We do this by iteratively
applying (12) on every edge.
3) We terminate the algorithm when no better path is
found after iterating through all edges.
The algorithm returns a provably optimal solution. This
result is proven in the next Subsection. As an added benefit,
the algorithm simultaneously solves for the optimal path for
all drivers in the road network. The total runtime remains
the same even if more drivers are added to the network.
Figure 2 illustrates the first few steps of running the
algorithm on a simple road network. Below, we present the
pseudocode for the algorithm. We use x.stay to denote J˜(x)
from (3), and e to denote the edge (x, y).
Algorithm 1 - Iteratively relax edges in the road network.
1: for x ∈ N do
2: x.value← x.stay . Initialize values to be the value for
staying at that node
3: x.next← −1 . -1 means stay at the current node
4: for i := 1 to N − 1 do
5: for (x, y) ∈ E do
6: relax(x, y)
7:
8: function RELAX(x, y)
9: x.value← (Re− w+fSeQe )(1−e
−QeTe)+e−QeTey.value
10: if value > x.value then
11: x.next← y
12: x.value← value
Algorithm 2 - Calculate the optimal path for the driver given
its starting location.
1: function GETPATH(x)
2: P ← [x]
3: while x.next 6= −1 do
4: x← x.next
5: P ← P + [x]
return P
The first algorithm finds the optimal next node to go for all
nodes. After processing the x.next values for all the nodes,
we can easily find the optimal path for any starting node
using the second algorithm GETPATH, which traverses the
next nodes in order.
A. Proof of Correctness
From Section III, we have that from any starting node,
there is an optimal policy that results in a path that traverses
at most n edges in E with probability 1. This result is used
to establish a proof of the optimality of the path returned by
the described algorithm.
From Section III, we see that there exists an optimal policy
of (17) that is also optimal for (4). Therefore, we can focus
on policies that are optimal for n decision stages. These
policies transverse a path of length less than or equal to
n. This motivates the following definition:
Definition 1. Let Vi(x) denote the optimal value attainable
if you start from x with i+ 1 decision stages, i.e. you start
at x and travel through a path of length at most i+ 1.
Recall that J∗(x) is the optimal value attainable, starting
from x, considering all potential policies and paths of po-
tentially infinite length. By definition of the optimal policy,
∀x ∈ N , ∀i ∈ N, Vi(x) ≤ J∗(x). Proposition 2 concludes
that ∀x ∈ N , Vn(x) = J∗(x). Note also that V0(x) = J˜(x)
according to our initialization. This leads to the following
Proposition:
Proposition 3. After n iterations of the for loops in line 4
of algorithm 1 (i.e. after we relax all the edges, repeatedly
for i times), for each node x the stored value V (x) of the
node satisfies the following:
1. It is the value obtained from a valid policy.
2. It is larger than or equal to Vi(x).
Proof. To prove the first property, we use induction and
consider what happens when a single edge is relaxed. For
the base case, at the start V (x) = J˜(x), and hence V (x) is
the value for a valid policy (waiting at the node x until a
ride request is received). In the inductive case, suppose we
relax edge (x, y), changing the value of node x from Vi(x)
to V (x), with V (x) as defined in line 9 of Algorithm 1.
From the previous step, V (y) is a value associated with a
valid policy. It thus follows that V (x) is the value of valid
policy since (x, y) ∈ E.
To prove the second property, we induct on the value
of i. In our base case i = 0, we initialized each node
with V (x) = J˜(x) = V0(x), so the second property holds
immediately. Then for our inductive case, suppose value
Vi(x) is achieved by a valid policy µ. After we relax all
of the edges, we aim to show through the inductive step
that V (x) ≥ Vi+1(x). Without loss of generality, assume the
action associated with node x under the optimal policy with
i+1 decision stages is µ1,1(x) = y, i.e. the chosen direction
from node x in stage 1 is towards node y. Then, by the
principal of optimality, Vi(y) must be the value achieved by
the same policy µ starting at y; otherwise we will be able to
achieve a better value of Vi+1(x) by selecting µ1,1(x) = y
and then following the policy that corresponds to Vi(y),
which violates the optimality of Vi+1(x).
From this we know that Vi+1(x) = (Re − w+fSeQe )(1 −
e−QeTe)+ e−QeTeVi(y) with e = (x, y). By our assumption
in the induction step, the value for node y after i iterations
of the for loop must satisfy V (y) ≥ Vi(y), because our
algorithm only increases the stored value V (y).
Then in the i-th iteration, when we update edge (x, y), we
have the inequality:
V (x) ≥ (Re − w + fSe
Qe
)(1− e−QeTe) + e−QeTeV (y)
≥ (Re − w + fSe
Qe
)(1− e−QeTe) + e−QeTeVi(y)
= Vi+1(x)
which completes the proof.
After n iterations of relaxing all edges, the values stored
in each node V (x) = Vn(x). As demonstrated in Proposition
2, Vn(x) = J∗(x).
Finally, observe that the x.next values for each node
provide the optimal stationary policy µ1(x) for each node
x ∈ N . Therefore, by tracing the sequence of decisions
{x0, x1 = x0.next, x2 = x1.next...} we can find a path
that follows the optimal policy, starting from an initial node
x0 ∈ N .
The algorithm gives a worst-case runtime of O(n|E|),
since relaxing each edge takes constant time, and we perform
O(n|E|) total relaxations in lines 4 and 5 of Algorithm 1.
We can assume a constant upper bound C on the number
of edges connected to any particular vertex in a transporta-
tion map, because the number of roads converging at any
particular intersection has some upper bound that does not
depend on the number of nodes, i.e. |E| ≤ Cn. Therefore
the worst-case runtime is O(n2). 5
V. IMPLEMENTATION
To demonstrate the feasibility and scalability of our al-
gorithm, we implemented it using road network data from
Boston, MA, and New York, NY. We used open source data
from Open Street Maps [15] to obtain the road network data.
We used posted speed limits as initial values for Se and Te.
We divide the map into a grid and set experimental values
5In practice, there are additional improvements that can be used to
decrease the runtime. Firstly, we can terminate the algorithm if the values
V (x) are unchanged after a full iteration. Our runtime will then be
O(lmaxE), where lmax is the maximum length of an optimal path in the
road network. This greatly reduces the runtime especially for large networks,
since typically each optimal path only spans a fraction of the set of all nodes.
Fig. 3. Implementation of the algorithm in Boston, MA. The top image
represents the expected value for drivers if they were to stay at that location
until they get the next passenger request J˜(x). Red and yellow boxes
representing higher and lower values of J˜(x) respectively. The bottom
image represents the routes returned by optimal policies for drivers at
starting nodes represented by the black dot. The color along the route
represents the probability that the driver still does not have a passenger
request when driving along the route at that location, with red and yellow
representing higher and lower probabilities, respectively. The probability
values are also marked at various points along the routes. For example, the
number 0.37 is marked along one route; this implies that the driver has
a 63% chance of receiving a ride request before arriving at that location
along the route. The end of the line indicates a location where the driver
will optimally wait until receiving a ride request.
for Re and Qe in each gridbox. Future research could utilize
TNC data to analyze the results and profit improvements for
this algorithm with realistic values of Re and Qe.
Figure 3 demonstrates an example output for the city of
Boston. We recorded the time taken to run the algorithm,
using a standard laptop with a Intel Core i7-5500U CPU @
2.40GHz×4 processor and 8GB RAM. Overall, the program
took less than 3 seconds to implement the optimization
algorithm, demonstrating the feasibility of our approach. The
relevant information is shown in Figure 4.
We can also compare the optimal driver value obtained by
our approach to the value obtained by other routing decisions.
City: Boston, MA
Network size 12541 Edges, 9072 Vertices
Data-process time 1.48s
Algorithm time 1.23s
Total area 41.1km2
Top-Right coordinates 42.38N, 71.03W
Bottom-Left coordinates 42.33N, 71.12W
City: New York, NY
Network size 20428 Edges, 13973 Vertices
Data-process time 4.25s
Algorithm time 2.31s
Total area 112.3km2
Top-Right coordinates 40.82N, 73.92W
Bottom-Left coordinates 40.70N, 74.02W
Fig. 4. Details for two implementations of our algorithm. Here, the data-
process time includes the time taken to parse the xml data of the road
network returned by OpenStreetMaps, and store it as a graph data structure.
The algorithm time includes the time taken to calculate the optimal policy
for all drivers given the road network graph and applicable parameters
For example, we can compare the optimal value to the value
associated with a route where the driver takes the shortest
path towards the node with the highest expected value J˜(x)
(we call this route the “shortest-route”). The shortest-route
represents a reasonable heuristic route for drivers in the
between-ride period: head towards the highest value location.
In the base case, the expected value of profit from the next
ride, averaged across all nodes in Boston when driving along
the optimal route is $6.78, while that of the shortest-route
is $6.44. The optimal between-ride solution provides a 5%
average improvement. At certain nodes, the optimal route
increases the expected value or profit by 25-50%.
The relative value of the optimal solution is significantly
higher in periods of congestion. If we assume that average
vehicle speeds are 1/2 of the posted speed limits, then the
average nodal value for the optimal policy is $5.61, versus
$4.99 for a policy that takes the shortest path to the highest
value node. In this case, the presented algorithm allows
a 12% improvement in driver profits. These calculations
represent a back-of-the-envelope effort to test the value of
our algorithm. Future research could use real-world price
and traffic data in order to more accurately measure the
benefits of our between-ride algorithm and to understand the
conditions that influence its value.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper models the between-ride routing problem for
private transportation providers. We seek to optimize routing
to maximize the expected value of profits for a driver that
does not currently have a passenger and who is awaiting
their next ride request. Our algorithm can account for various
factors, including the pickup rate at different locations, surge
pricing, fuel costs, and traffic conditions.
We model the decision problem as an dynamic program
with an uncertain number of stages before termination; this is
equivalent to the stochastic shortest path problem. We show
that under reasonable conditions, the between-ride problem
can be solved to optimality by solving a simpler finite-
horizon dynamic program. We present an algorithm using
an iterative technique related to Value Iteration, and illustrate
the feasibility of this algorithm by implementing it on road
networks from Boston and New York City.
There are several interesting areas for future research re-
lated to the between-ride routing problem. Our algorithm fo-
cuses on a single between-ride period. Future research could
focus on the driver’s optimization problem over multiple
rides, considering variability in the probability distribution
of ride destinations from different origins.
Our algorithm focuses on the case where the behavior of
individual drivers does not substantively change the rate of
passenger ride requests or the value of rides in different loca-
tions. When there are multiple drivers in the network, driver
behavior could impact prices and pickup rates at different
locations. In this case, the optimal between-ride behavior
of drivers would anticipate the behavior and trajectory of
other drivers. Extensions could use tools from game theory
or mean field theory to develop optimal driver strategies that
anticipate the decisions of other drivers.
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